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NOTE
FEDERAL INcoME TAx LAW IN
FUTURE INTEREST TRANSACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
F UTURE interests are generally associated with estate and gift
taxes and do not as frequently become a factor in the determina-
tion of taxable income as defined in the Internal Revenue Code.' In
fact, narrowing the subject to income tax problems does not avoid
consideration of the estate and gift tax provisions of the Code,
because federal income tax law in this area relies heavily upon the
theories and practices developed for estate and gift taxation. The
income tax basis of a future interest in property will frequently be
derived from an estate tax valuation.
Future interest income tax problems can be divided into two
categories. The first involves measurement of the taxable gain
or loss to be reported upon the sale, exchange, or release of a
deferred property interest. The second involves computation of
the deduction from income to reflect a contribution to charity of
a property interest with intervening rights reserved to the donor.
Many mechanical procedures are common to both areas.
I. MEASUREMENT OF GAIN OR Loss
A. General Principles
Taxable gain measurement axioms dictate elimination from
the "amount realized"2 of that portion which represents a return
of capital to the vendor. Computation of the amount of this portion,
that is the tax "basis"' of the property being given up, relies upon
rules exclusive to future interest transactions.
1INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 63.
2 id. at § 1001. This section provides for the determination of the amount of and
recognition of gain or loss.
3 Id. at §§ 1012, 1014, 1015. Section 1012 provides that "It]he basis of property shall
be the cost of such property, except as otherwise provided .... " Sections 1014 and
1015, respectively except from the cost rule property acquired from a decedent and
property acquired by gifts and transfers in trust.
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In considering future interests, it is imperative to distinguish
between problems in determining the basis of a party holding a
fractional interest (hereinafter referred to as original basis prob-
lems) and problems in determining how much basis must be
allocated to a disposition of a fractional interest when the basis
previously determined includes a greater interest than that being
conveyed. Valuation devices for establishing the fair market value
of fractional interests in property are to be explored in subsequent
sections of this paper.
Many future interests find their origin in trust instruments,
and in applying rules for establishment of the original basis of
"property acquired by gifts or transfers in trust,"4 an important
area of exceptions must always be considered. Under certain con-
ditions inter vivos transfers will be construed under the federal
tax statutes as incomplete until the date of the grantor's death, and
in these situations the gift property will take basis under the rules
established relative to property acquired from a decedent.' Important
examples involve cases where the grantor retained a reversionary
interest and cases where certain facts can create statutory pre-
sumptions that the gift was made "in contemplation of death.""
B. Estate Tax Original Basis Considerations
1. Statutory Foundation
The general rule with regard to determining the basis of
property acquired from a decedent is that the property takes its
basis from "the fair market value of the property at the date of
the decedent's death"' (or optional valuation date one year after
the date of death).8
4 Id. at § 1015. For a treatment of the taxation of trusts see, Note, Federal Income
Taxation of Estates and Trusts, 43 DENVER L.J. 183 (1966); and Gelband, Taxation
of Trust Income, N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 233 (1966).
5 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014(b). On providing for establishing the basis of
property acquired from a decedent, § 1014(b) enumerates acquisitions which "shall
be considered to have been acquired from or to have passed from the decedent" even
though actually acquired by intervivos transfer.
6 id. at § 2035.
7 1d. at § 1014(a).
8 7 Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-1(a) (1957). The regulation states: "The purpose of section
1014 is, in general, to provide a basis for property acquired from a decedent which
is equal to the value placed upon such property for purposes of the Federal estale ,s:
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The general rule is effectively expanded when considering
future interest valuation problems. The Code provides that "[pirop-
erty passing without full and adequate consideration under a general
power of appointment exercised by the decedent by will" will be
treated for basis purposes as property acquired from the decedent.'
Similar treatment may be accorded property acquired by non-
exercise of a general power if the donee died after December 31,
1953.1" In these cases the property is deemed to have been acquired
on the estate tax valuation date. In other cases of property acquired
under a power of appointment, the tax basis will be established as
if the property had been acquired by gift from the creator of the
power.
Obviously, the regulation governing estate tax valuations will
be instrumental in determination of the original tax basis of a
substantial portion of the future property interests which become
involved in income tax transactions." Section 1 of the regulation
sets forth the basic rule for valuation: "The fair market value is
the price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any com-
pulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
the relevant facts."' 2 The regulation continues to enumerate special-
ized methods for valuation of specific classes of property.' 3
The final section of the regulation provides for "valuation
of property not specifically described in §§ 20.2031-2 to 20.2031-8
... ..- These residual properties are to be valued "in accordance
9 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014(b) (4).
10 Id. at § 1014(b) (9).
1 Although it is recognized that other methods exist for determining basis to compute
taxable gain or loss, this paper will concentrate on a discussion of estate tax valua-
tions.
12 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958). The regulation goes on to say: "Thus, in the
case of an item of property includible in the decedent's gross estate, which is gener-
ally obtained by the public in the retail market, the fair market value of such an item
of property is the price at which the item or a comparable item would be sold at
retail."
13 Id. Section 2 provides for valuation of stocks and bonds, § 3 for interests in business,
§ 4 for notes, § 5 for cash on hand or on deposit, §6 for household and personal
effects, § 7 for annuities, life estates, terms for years, remainders and reversions, and
§ 8 for certain life insurance and annuity contracts and shares in an open-end invest-
ment company. All of these sections are but specialized methods for determining fair
market value at the retail price.
14Id. at § 20.2031-9 (1958).
VOL. 46
with the general principles set forth in § 20.2031-1"'" quoted
above. Section 9 of that regulation continues: "For example, a
future interest in property not subject to valuation in accordance
with the actuarial principles set forth in 20.2031-7 is to be valued
in accordance with the general principles set forth in Section
20.2031-1."' 6
2. Actuarial Method
From the preceding quote, the question arises: what future
interests are subject to valuation in accordance with actuarial
principles? Actuarial methods are not a substitute for establishing
time periods which are more accurately predictable. 7 Thus, a
standard discount rate to establish the present value of a future
interest is not satisfactory, nor necessary, when such value can be
arrived at with certainty.' s However, actuarial methods are adequate
tools for the determination of the present value of a future interest
not otherwise ascertainable. 9
However, the appropriateness of the actuarial method where
factors are uncertain has long been established. Judge Learned
Hand summarized the philosophy in 1943:
When compelled to take present action based upon forecasts
of a man's life, courts have long been accustomed to use mortality
tables; for, although logicians may say that probability never tells
us anything about a given instance, in fact we never make a de-
cision, or take a step, except in reliance upon it; and it so happens
that in this particular matter the probability has been refined by
averaging an enormous number of instances.
20
The Commissioner's tables, to which various income tax as
well as estate and gift tax regulations refer, are released by the
Internal Revenue Service. 21 Tables I and II are published in the
15 Id. The corresponding regulation section dealing with actuarial valuation of gifts
is Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (1958).
16Id. at § 20.2031-9 (1958).
17 See discussion in text § II(B) (3) inra.
18 That is, if the time when the interest is to be enjoyed is definite and not dependent
upon the death of some person, actuarial methods are not to be used.
19 It must be remembered that Treas. Reg. §§2031.2-6, 8 set forth specific methods for
arriving at fair market value. Hence, any resort to actuarial methods in § 7 must be
in situations extraneous to those enumerated in the foregoing sections.
20 Bankers Trust Co. v. Higgins, 136 F.2d 477, 479 (2d Cir. 1943).
251RS Publication No. 11, Rev. 5-59.
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estate tax regulations 22 and supplemented by Publication No. 11.
2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1958). The two tables are:
TABLE I
Table, single life, 32 percent, showing the present worth of an annuity, of a life












































40 ....... ...... 17.9738
41 ............. 17.6853
42 ........ ... 17.3911
43 .-...........17.0913
44 ............... 16.7860
45 ........ ... 16.4754
46 .................-16.1596
47 ....... ..... 15.8388


























































(1) (2) (3) (4)














65 . ....... 9 5486
66 .. ......... 9.1960












79 .................. 5 0572
80 .................. 4.7884
81 ............ 4.5283
82 . .......... 4.2771

































































































































Kept to date by U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News Pamphlets.
TABLE II
Table showing the present worth at 31/2 percent of an annuity for a term certain, of
an income interest for a term certain, and of a remainder interest postponed for
a term certain.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Annuity Term Remainder Number of Annuity Term Remainder
years certain years certain
1 ................ 0.9662 0.033816 0.966184
2 ................ 1.8997 .066489 .933511
3 ................ 2.8016 .098057 .901943
4 ................ 3.6731 .128558 .871442
5 ................ 4.5151 .158027 .841973
6 ................ 5.3286 .186499 .813501
7 ............... 6 1145 .214009 .785991
8 ................ 6.8740 .240588 .759412
9 ............... 7.6077 .266269 .733731
10 .............. 8 3166 .291081 .708919
11 ................ 9 0016 .315054 .684946
12 ............... 9 6633 .338217 .661783
13 . ....... 10,3027 .360596 .639404
14 ......... 10.9205 .382218 .617782
15 ................ 11.5174 .403109 .596891
16 ................ 12.0941 .423294 .576706
17 ............... 12.6513 .442796 .557204
18 . ........ 13.1897 .461639 .538361
19 ....... 13.7098 .479844 .520156
20 ................ 14 2124 .497434 .502566
21 ................ 14.6980 .514429 .485571
22 . 15.1671 .530849 .469151
23 ................ 15.6204 .546714 .453286
24 . 16.0584 .562043 .437957
25 ................ 16 4815 .576853 .423147
26 ................ 16.8904 .591162 .408838
27 . 17.2854 .604988 .395012
28 ................ 17 6670 .618340 .381654
29 ................ 18.0358 .631252 .368748
30 ................ 18.3920 .643722 .356278
A survey of the table of contents of the booklet discloses that the
tables are intended to cover a wide variety of remainders, life
estates, and reversions. The problems are raised by way of ex-
amples, many of which involve contingencies, and a solution for
each example is included.
In addition, the introductory paragraphs of the booklet provide
for obtaining valuation factors from the Commissioner in those
cases where a factor cannot be computed from the tables. The Com-
missioner will not, however, compute factors to satisfy hypothetical
questions; it is mandatory that the facts submitted relate to an
actual decedent or a completed gift.
3. Interests Not Subject to Actuarial Valuation
As previously suggested, a common device for avoiding use
of the tables and related regulations is an argument that the par-
ticular property interest in question is beyond the scope of actuarial
valuation techniques. Mertens ably defines the issue: "The variety
and complexities of a transferor's desire to cover all conceivable or
desirable future contingencies have outstripped the statutory pro-
visions, the regulations, and indeed the actuarial art itself and
makes a precise and controlling statement of such limits [for em-
ployment of actuarial techniques] impossible."23
A 1961 revenue ruling holds that a remainder interest which
will vest only upon the death without issue of a married woman
aged 44 who has never had children is not susceptible to valuation
under the actuarial rules.24 This ruling cites the Supreme Court's
Commissioner v. Sternberger25 decision which had denied an estate
tax charitable contribution deduction for the actuarial value of a
remainder interest which could vest only if the decedent's 27-year
old daughter failed to remarry and have children. The court with
a degree of skepticism had noted that the actuarial computations
omitted adjustments to reflect the fact that the daughter had a two
million dollar inducement to remarry and have children.
The revenue ruling continues in its comments on the Sternberger
case to draw some conclusions which are important to this section
of this paper as well as in the subsequent section on charitable
contributions. The ruling concludes that "merely because an in-
terest in property cannot be evaluated with sufficient accuracy to
support a deduction, it does not necessarily follow that the interest
is without value. ' 2
6
23 J. MERTENS, FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 7.10 '(1959).
24 Rev. Rul. 88, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 417.
2348 U.S. 187 (1955).
26 Rev. Rul. 88, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 417-18.
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The ruling makes it clear that the interest could be valued
for purposes of gross estate inclusion under the general fair market
value rules of § 20.2031-1 even though the actuarial rules of
§ 20.2031-7 cannot be applied. This means that a property interest
could be attributed with basis in an income tax transaction to the
extent which it had been included in a gross estate, even though it
was not subject to actuarial valuation.
A more recent federal district court decision 27 illustrates some
of the complexities of fact which produce problems in actuarial
valuation, although in this instance the court was not required to
determine whether or not actuarial rules would be applied. The case
involved valuation of a vested reversionary interest subject to being
divested by exercise of a power of appointment. The donor of the
testamentary power (conceded to be a special power) had made no
provision for disposition of the remainder of the trust property in
event his donee-daughter failed to exercise the power in her will.
This omission by the donor had, of course, created the reversion in
his estate.
The daughter did exercise the power in her will, but the In-
ternal Revenue Service attempted to include the value of the entire
trust assets in the daughter's taxable estate, contending that the
reversion inherited by the daughter had merged with her life estate
and with her power to appoint by will, giving her an absolute
interest in the trust property. However, the government contention
was denied. The restrictions imposed on the power made it clear
that the donor had never intended that an absolute interest vest in
the daughter. The court recognized that the fair market value of
the reversion was subject to inclusion in the daughter's taxable
estate but found that the interest had no market value due to the
daughter's inability to convey the interest without entering a con-
tract promising not to exercise the power, a promise which would
have frustrated her father's testamentary intent.28
The Internal Revenue Service has acknowledged that actual
life expectancy can be substituted for actuarial table expectancies
in cases where "it is known on the valuation date that a life tenant
is afflicted with a fatal and incurable disease in its advanced stages,
and that he cannot survive for more than a brief period of time
'29 This follows the rule expressed by the Tax Court in the
2
7 Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 532 (D. Md. 1964).
28 Id. at 536.
2Rev. Rul. 307, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 429.
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Estate of Nellie H. Jennings3" which involved valuation of a re-
mainder estate being bequeathed to charity after a life estate in the
decedent's invalid husband had terminated. The court stated the
proposition "that the use of established mortality tables, which are
evidentiary only, must give way to the proven facts which show
a less life expectancy.'
'
3
The Jennings decision also quotes the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Provident Trust Co." to the effect that values
'must be determined from data available at the time of death of
decedent." 3 The Provident Trust decision and the Supreme Court's
preceding holding in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States" also
establish the principle that hindsight is not relevant. The actual
death of the life tenant prior to the filing of the estate tax return
will not preclude application of actuarial tables to establish the life
tenant's life expectancy as of the estate tax valuation date.
A more recent Tax Court memorandum opinion considers a
contingent remainder which the remainderman had conveyed by
gift in order to be sure that it would not be included in his taxable
estate.35 The life tenant died prematurely within two months after
the gift, and this was a case where the Commissioner desired to
substitute the actual life as determined for the expectancy to be
produced by his own mortality table. The gift tax deficiency im-
posed by the Commissioner as a result of substituting actual life
in the valuation factor was almost a million dollars.
The Tax Court recognized the rules of the above cited cases
and held, in addition, that to avoid use of the tables, the life span
as of the date of transfer must be ascertainable with exactitude."6
The Commissioner was held to the use of the tables in this case
where it had not been shown that the life tenant's date of death
was predictable at the time of the gift.3 7
30 10 T.C. 323 (1948). The court held:
The evidence is that at the date of decedent's death the life expectancy of her
husband was not more than one year. [Such evidence being derived from
husband's physical condition, not established mortality tables.] Actually,
he lived only two months. We therefore sustain petitioner's contention that
the valuation of the life estate, which must be deducted from charitable
bequests, should be based upon a life expectancy of not more than one
year.
Id. at 328.
31 Id. at 327.
32291 U.S. 272 (1934).
33 Id. at 281.
34279 U.S. 151 (1929).
35Chauncey Stilman v. Comm'r., 24 CCH TAx CT. MEM. (1965).




4. Validity of the Tables
In some instances, those desiring to challenge applicability of
the tables have looked to the structure of the tables themselves
rather than to the nature of the property interest to be valuated.
The present actuarial tables utilize a 32 percent discount rate com-
pounded annually and the "Makehamized" mortality table which
appears as Table 38 of United States Life Tables and Actuarial
Tables 1939-1941, published by the Bureau of Census. 8
Tables in use before January 1, 1952 used mortality factors
based on the experience of 17 British insurance companies between
the years 1762 and 1837.39 Needless to say, the use of these life
expectancies gave cause for concern, but their obsolescence prob-
ably worked to the tax advantage of the concerned parties as often
as to their disadvantage. One may speculate that this was one
reason why the use of the tables had not been successfully challenged
on this infirmity.
There have been many serious and more recent questions raised
as to the appropriateness of the interest rate. As noted above, the cur-
rent Internal Revenue Service tables were compiled using a 31/2 per-
cent factor,40 although tables in use before 1952 use 4 percent.41 The
Tax Court has taken its stand with reference to deviations from the
rates: "To avoid introducing unnecessary complexity and confusion
into this broad and active field, we take the view that the method
prescribed in the regulations is to be followed unless the facts present
a substantial reason for departure therefrom. ' 42 This court went on
to find an actual yield of 4.34 percent on the single common stock
held in trust and held there was not "sufficient basis" for deviating
from the 4 percent discount rate which was at that time incorporated
in the Commissioner's tables.43
Other cases have permitted alternative rates of return to be
substituted for those in the tables. 44 The Court of Claims in
Hanley v. United States45 found that a 3.09 percent return was sub-
38 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES LIFE AND ACTUARIAL TABLES, 1939-41
(1946). Since these tables are not currently in use they are not included for reference.
39 Koshland v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1949).
40 See table, supra note 22.
41 Supra note 32.
GEstate of Irma E. Green, 22 T.C. 728, 732 (1954). See also, McMurtry v. Comm'r,
203 F.2d 659 (1st Cir. 1953) where the court held that although "valuing individual
life interests by resort to mortality tables may be educated guesswork," the discrep-
ancies will average out in the long run. Id. at 666-67.
43 Estate of Irma E. Green, 22 T.C. 728, 733 '(1954).
4Hanley v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 73 (Ct. Cl. 1945); Huntington Nat'l Bank,
13 T.C. 760 (1949).
563 F. Supp. 73 (Ct. Cl. 1745).
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stantially at variance with the 4 percent tables,4" and a later Tax
Court decision permitted use of a 312 percent actual yield in lieu
of the 4 percent tables.
47
A very recent Fourth Circuit decision, Rosen v. Commissioner,"8
permitted a taxpayer to use the tables in valuation, for gift tax
exclusion purposes, of an income interest in closely held corporate
stocks despite the Commissioner's protests that the stock had neither
paid nor could be expected to pay a dividend. The court said that
"[r]esort to the tables is justified in cases where valuation neces-
sarily presents an element of speculation and where use of the
tables is actuarially sound."4 The court did note that the trustees
had power to sell the donated shares and invest the proceeds in
income producing property.
As in cases involving actual life expectancies, it appears that
the Commissioner may have been less successful in deviating from
his actuarial tables than the taxpayers. In Rosen, the court recog-
nized that "[n]eutral principles forbid that the Commissioner be
allowed to apply the tables where to do so produces greater revenue
and to refuse application where it does not.""0
An earlier district court decision 5' had denied the Commissioner
his presumption of correctness when it had been shown that the
method substituted by the Commissioner for the actuarial tables
was erroneous. The court summarized the justification for broad
application of the tables:
The valuation of future interest is at best a highly speculative
undertaking not unlike the determination of life expectancy which
courts and juries are called upon to make in almost all personal
injury actions. Recognizing that the value of future interest cannot
be determined with any degree of certainty, those called upon to
make valuations have resorted to established computations which
seldom accurately predict the value in a particular situation but
prove to be accurate when used in a great number of instances. 52
With reference to the substitution of actual known rates of
return, it must be noted that the regulations provide separately and
specifically for valuation of all interests in commercial annuity
contracts and insurance contracts.5" Surely a vast majority of the
46 ld. The court stated further: "The Commissioner recognizes that when the facts
indicate the use of a rate other than 4% he will use such rate." Id. at 77.
47 Huntington Nat'l Bank, 13 T.C. 760 (1949).
48 397 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1968).
49Id. at 247.
5Id. at 248.
51 Hipp v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 222 (W.D.S.C. 1962).
52Id. at 226.
53Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (1958).
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contracts in which the rate of return is fixed in advance will fall
into these classifications.
C. Allocation of Basis
The regulations provide that:
When a part of a larger property is sold, the cost or other
basis of the entire property shall be equitably apportioned among
the several parts, and the gain realized or loss sustained on the
part of the entire property sold is the difference between the
selling price and the cost or other basis allocated to such part.54
Other income tax regulations describe in detail the mechanics
involved in measuring the gain on a "[s]ale or other disposition
of a life interest, remainder interest, or other interest in property
acquired from a decendent."55 There are, however, no corresponding
instructions to cover dispositions of property not acquired by be-
quest or inheritance. The actuarial method prescribed by regulation
for property acquired from a decendent has been accepted by the
courts when applied to property acquired by deed,56 but in 1965
the Tax Court acknowledged that "[njeither the Code nor the
regulations prescribe a method for allocating a lump-sum basis
when the owner of a fee simple interest conveys, inter vivos, a less-
than-fee estate.
' 57
This case involved the sale of ranch lands located within
Grand Teton National Park to the National Park Service with
a life estate retained by the sellers. The court permitted the Com-
missioner to apportion basis using a ratio formed with the actual
amount paid by the government for the remainder interest over
the appraised value of the fee simple. The court recognized the
above cited regulation and the Camden v. Commissioner" de-
cision but concluded that these imposed no requirement that the
actuarial tables be used. The Commissioner's method was found
to be both logical and reasonable.
It must be noted, however, that the court was not informed
as to what method of attributing value between respective interests
had been used by the National Park Service in arriving at the
price to be offered for the remainders. If the actual price paid had
been determined with reference to the life expectancies of the seller,
the Commissioner's pro-rations had in effect duplicated the actuarial
method prescribed in the regulation which the court purported to
5id. at § 1.61-6(a) (1957).
55 d. at § 1.1014-5(a) (1957).
56 Estate of Johnson N. Camden, 47 B.T.A. 926 (1952) afId, Camden v. Commissioner,
139 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1943).
57 Eileen M. Hunter, 44 T.C. 109, 115 (1965).
58 139 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1943).
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ignore. Of course the discount rate selected to determine the actual
price, if different than that used in the Commissioner's tables, could
cause a difference in amounts.
It is clear in the decision that the court would have considered
the actuarial method appropriate. Part of its readiness to accept the
alternative method arose from impatience with the petitioner-tax-
payers who had concentrated on allegations of "arrogant usurpation
of authority by incompetent and ruthless employees of the Govern-
ment."5 The judge regretted the petitioners' failure to rely to a
greater extent on substantive tax law.
Certainly the regulation governing apportionment of the basis
of property acquired from a decedent must be recognized as an
appropriate guide in apportioning basis whenever there is a con-
veyance of a life estate or remainder interest, whatever its source;
but, because so many such interests originate in wills, the regulation
is of pervasive importance in taxation of future interest transactions.
D. Uniform Basis
Section 4 of Regulation 1.1014 introduces a concept known as
the principle of uniform basis. In the words of this regulation, the
basis of the property "will be the same, or uniform, whether the
property is possessed or enjoyed by the executor or administrator,
the heir, the legatee or devisee, or the trustee or beneficiary of a
trust created by will or an inter vivos trust.''60
Section 5 provides for allocation of basis upon disposition of
one of multiple interests in property.6" The regulation, for this
purpose, incorporates by reference the same actuarial tables pre-
viously considered in connection with estate tax valuations. Also
repeated is the offer of factors to be furnished by the Internal
Revenue Service in actual situations which do not conform to the
tables.
The text of the regulation provides that: "[I1n ascertaining the
basis of a life interest, remainder interest, or other interest which
is sold or otherwise disposed of, the uniform basis rule contemplates
that proper adjustments will be made to reflect the change in
relative value of the interests on account of the passage of time."62
In other words, the total basis as established by estate tax
valuation does not change, but apportionment of this total basis
among fractional interests is dependent upon actuarial factors which
are applied at the time the fractional interest is sold. This means
59 1d. at 112.
6
Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4 (1957).
61




that the tax basis of a fractional interest fluctuates as the life ex-
pectancies of the interested parties diminish. The result is a situ-
ation seemingly without parallel in income tax procedures. The
basis of an individual property owner's interest is permitted to
change with the passage of time even though no basis adjustments
are being reflected in the computations of periodic taxable income.
There is, of course, an offsetting change to the tax basis of some
other owner of a related property interest.
The principle of uniform basis has been developed to deal
with problems involving the amount of basis in a fractional interest
in property, but related rules are designed to establish a certain
uniformity in methods for establishing the time of acquisition for
tax purposes of property acquired from a decedent. The time factor
is critical to many income tax determinations.
Prior to the Supreme Court's Helvering v. Reynolds63 decision
in 1941 there had been conflict as to whether contingent remainders
would take their basis from the fair market value at the date of
the testator's death or from their fair market value when they
became finally vested. Justice Douglas, in Reynolds, noted that
"to carry into that [basis] computation the value of property at
the time the taxpayer had only a contingent remainder interest in
it is not to tax him on values which he never received. ' 64 Presently,
the income tax basis rules do not distinguish between vested and
contingent remainders.
The Reynolds decision reaffirms an exception to the uniform
basis rules which had been established in an earlier Supreme Court
decision, Maguire v. Commissioner.65 When a remainderman of a
testamentary trust receives property which was purchased by the
trustee and not included in the property distributed from the settlor's
estate, the remainderman's basis is the same as the trustee's basis.
The propriety of this exception is clear when one considers that
the trustee must file income tax returns and recognize the taxable
transactions which would arise when the property acquired by the
trust from the decedent was converted to other property. By the
same reasoning, the uniform basis rule does not preclude the Code
§ 1016 adjustments to basis for depreciation, depletion, and capital
improvements."
Early Board of Tax Appeal decisions compelled a remainderman
to reduce his basis by the actuarial value of a life estate or estate
"3 313 U.S. 428 (1941).
64 Id. at 434.
6 313 U.S. 1 (1941). The Court held: "As respects the property which was purchased
by the trustees, we are of the view that its cost to them, rather than its value at the
date of delivery to the taxpayer, governs." Id. at 8-9.
66Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4 (1957).
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for a term of years which had already expired. 6 This rule, of
course, cannot be reconciled with the uniform basis doctrine or
with the principles applied in the Maguire and Reynolds decisions.
The concept of shifting basis, long incorporated in the regulations,
dictates that as the intervening estate approaches its termination,
the basis shifts to the remainder; and when the remainderman takes
title to the property, he acquires also the total original tax basis
as determined by the estate tax valuation.
The conflict was resolved in 1937 when the board acknowl-
edged that its position had been erroneous. "8 The remainderman,
who had already come into possession of the property, was per-
mitted in this case to deduct as basis the entire original estate tax
value upon sale of the property.
II. CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
A. Principles
As noted in the paragraphs introducing this work, mechanical
methods for measuring the amount of a tax deduction for a con-
tribution to charity of a future interest are similar to those applied
in the determination of tax basis. The charitable contributions
regulations6" rely upon the same tables, those provided in Internal
Revenue Service Publication No. 11 entitled Actuarial Values for
Estate and Gift Tax.
70
Undoubtedly, the procedures for valuation of future interests
find their most frequent exercise in the areas of charitable contri-
butions. Contributions to charity of remainder interests with a
beneficial life estate reserved to the donor are a popular tax saving
device, and an effective method by which the property owner can
with certainty designate his charitable beneficiaries while retaining
unrestricted use of the property during his lifetime.
"If a contribution is made in property other than money, the
amount of the deduction is determined by the fair market value of
the property at the time of the contribution."'" This excerpt from
the regulation established an exception to the general rule in tax
67 William Huggett, 24 B.T.A. 669 (1931); rev'd, Huggett v. Burnet, 64 F.2d 705
(D.C. Cir. 1933) ; but see, Elizabeth S. Vale, 30 B.T.A. 1351 (1934).
68 William H. Slack, Jr., 36 B.T.A. 105 (1937). The court said:
In the case of Elizabeth S. Vale, 30 B.T.A. 1351, the Board adhered to
the opinion it had adopted in the case of William Huggett, supra, rejecting
the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals in Huggett v. Burnet, supra.
The Board is now convinced that its position in the Vale case was erroneous
and that case will not be followed in the future.
Id. at 109.
69
Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(d)(2) (1958).
70 IRS Publication No. 11, Rev. 5-59.
71Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) (1958).
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law that a deduction must always be limited to the taxpayer's basis
in the property given up. Such an exception is difficult to ration-
alize within the framework of traditional income measurement prin-
ciples and would seem to originate simply from a governmental
policy of encouraging charitable donations.
Clearly future interests qualify as property other than money.
The regulation provides that "[a] deduction may be allowed for a
contribution of an interest in the income from property or an in-
terest in the remainder .... .72
B. To Irrevocably and Unconditionally Vest in Charity
The regulation paragraph following that cited above, however,
imposes a general limitation with broad effects:
If as of the date of a gift a transfer for charitable purposes
is dependent upon the performance of some act or the happening
of a precedent event in order that it might become effective, no
deduction is allowable unless the possibility that the charitable
transfer will not become effective is so remote as to be negligible. 78
The courts have narrowly confined income tax deductions to
those meeting a test of strict unconditional vesting,74 although
estate tax deductions have been permitted where "there is virtually
no possibility that anyone other than the charity will take the
property."'
7 5
The Code provides specific guidelines for gifts to trusts in-
volving reversions:
No deduction shall be allowed under this section for the value of
any interest in property transferred after March 9, 1954, to a
trust if -
(i) the grantor has a reversionary interest in the corpus
or income of that portion of the trust with respect
to which a deduction would (but for this subpara-
graph) be allowable under this section; and
(ii) at the time of the transfer the value of such rever-
sionary interest exceeds 5 percent of the value of the
property constituting such portion of the trust.76
The regulation defines the term "reversionary interest" as:
[A] possibility that after the possession or enjoyment of property or
its income has been obtained by a charitable donee, the property or
its income may revest in the grantor or his estate, or may be subject
to a power exercisable by the grantor or a non-adverse party (within
the meaning of section 672(b)), or both, to revest in, or return to
72
1d. at § 1.170-1(d) (1958).
rId. at § 1.170-1(e) (1958).
4See, Schoellkopf v. United States, 124 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1942).
75Polster v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1960).
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or for the benefit of, the grantor or his estate the property or income
therefrom.77
The subsequent paragraph of the regulation providing instruc-
tions for valuation of reversions and remainder interests refers to
the by now familiar estate tax actuarial tables."8
C. Severance of the Charitable Interest
The doctrine that the charitable interest must be severable from
its related noncharitable interests is dictated by logic; for without
such a rule, there is no acceptable formula for ascertaining the
value of the interest to be deducted. 79
A practical illustration of inability to sever is provided by a
gift to charity of a remainder interest in a trust in which the trustee
has power to invest in mutual funds and allocate capital gains to
income. A purchaser of mutual fund shares acquires rights in the
unrealized appreciation in securities held by the fund at the time of
his purchase. This appreciation will ultimately be realized and
distributed by the fund to its shareholders in the form of capital
gain dividends. An income beneficiary who is permitted to receive
these distributions will be eroding the trust corpus which was desig-
nated for charity, and there is no means of determining in advance
the rate at which this erosion will occur. There is, therefore, no
method to ascertain the deductible value of the charitable interest.
Comparable problems arise whenever the trustee is granted
broad discretion in the selection of investments and the determi-
nation of distributable trust income. A 1965 Tax Court decision,
James v. Darling,80 involves fractional remainder interests in num-
erous Denver real properties. In disallowing deductions for char-
itable contributions of the remainders, the court explicity declined
to address the issue as to whether or not "failure to provide for a
depreciation reserve in the trust renders the gifts of future interests
in depreciable properties unassured and unascertainable in amount."'"
Instead, the decision relied upon the fact that the powers
reserved to the trustee for the benefit of the life tenants were
entirely too broad to permit assurance that a gift of ascertainable
value had been conveyed to the charity.82 This case, which involved
77Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(d)(1) (1958).
78 1d. § 1.170-2(d)(2).
79Rev. Rul. 33, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 62, which states in part: "If there are non-
charitable income beneficiaries, a charitable remainder interest in corpus which is
subject to such power of investment, and diversion, cannot be severed from the
noncharitable income interest in the absence of an acceptable formula for ascertaining
the value of the remainder interest." Id. at 63.
8o43 T.C. 520 (1965).




a reservation by the donors of powers to control disposition of the
properties and reinvestment of the proceeds, includes a compre-
hensive review of the prior cases involving the ability to sever.
A similar result occurred in the case of Jones v. United States 3
involving an assignment of an endowment policy to charity. De-
duction of the present value of installment payments on matured
endowment policies was disallowed because assignment of the in-
stallments was conditioned by a provision that any installments
due after the death of the donor were to be paid to designated
survivors. The court denied deduction of the present values despite
the fact that the computations reflected the actuarial probability of
the donor being survived by the designated beneficiary.84
In a later tax court case85 the facts were distinguished from
those in the Darling and Jones decisions cited above, and the deduc-
tion was allowed for contributions to a trust even though the husband
and wife donors were also the trustees with broad powers to manage,
sell, and reinvest the trust corpus. The court found it "highly im-
probable that the petitioners in their fiduciary capacity will ever
perform an act which will defeat the charitable remainders they have
created in the trust."86 Important considerations were the donor's will
by which his residuary estate "poured over" into the charitable trust,
the meticulous records by which the donor segregated the trust assets
from his own, and his preesstablished favor for the charitable
remaindermen.
This trust instrument also provided that the contributions could
be recaptured by the donors if the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
did not allow an income tax deduction, but the court denied that
the Commissioner's administrative disallowance of the contribution
deduction had triggered recapture. Instead, it was decided that
possibility of recapture could not be determined without knowledge
of the final outcome of the litigation being decided.
The Commissioner has ruled, however, that no deduction
would be allowed for contributions to a trust with a savings pro-
vision calling for revocation of the trustee's powers to whatever
extent necessary to make the charitable remainder inovlved a sever-
able and ascertainable interest deductible for federal tax purposes.
8 7
8252 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
84 Id. at 267. The court said:
At the time of the assignments there existed a probability, variously esti-
mated by the parties to be either 6.8% or 11.1%, that the Miniger Founda-
tion would receive nothing as the result of these assignments, or that, having
taken something, it would receive nothing further, and that these chances
of not so taking were not so remote as to be negligible.
85 Id. William D. O'Brien, 46 T.C. 583 (1966).
86 Id. at 596.
87 Rev. Rul. 1944, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 442.
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This ruling considers such savings provisions contrary to public
policy and void. Therefore, the powers rendering the charitable
remainder nonseverable and not subject to ascertainment remain
effective.
The public policy considerations are found in the frustrating
effects of the described provisions on tax enforcement efforts and
in concern that no valid case or controversy would be presented to
a court deciding upon the the severance issue. All determinations,
at any level, in favor of the Internal Revenue Service would simply
defeat the gift.
There is another area in which the donor of a potentially de-
ductible charitable contribution of a future interest must exercise
caution. An income interest in stocks of a corporation controlled by
the donor or certain of his relatives may be found nonseverable
because the donor, through his stockholder voting powers to control
dividend distributions by the corporation, has effectively retained
a discretionary power to control distributions to the income
beneficiary.88
D. Tangible Personal Property
Before 1964 there existed a popular practice of donating
tangible personal property, most commonly art objects or rare books,
to a charitable institution with a life estate reserved to the donor.
This provided the donor with an income tax deduction for the fair
market value of the remainder irrespective of the amount of his
investment or basis in the object.
Establishing the market value of rare objects almost inevitably
involved the subjective determinations of a specialized appraiser
whose opinions were difficult to challenge and practically impos-
sible to disprove. Often the donee, a museum, library, or university,
offered the most authoritative source of expert appraisal advice;
but certainly the institution, being anxious to retain the favors of
its benefactors, could not be expected to provide completely im-
partial services when only the taxing authorities stood to lose by
its bias.
The result was generous income tax deductions for illusory
contributions, as the deduction could far exceed the total cost of the
object to the donor who was not even required to give up possession.
Congress reacted in the Revenue Act of 1964 with the addition
of Code Section 170(f) which says in part that:
[P]ayment of a charitable contribution which consists of a future
interest in tangible personal property shall be treated as made only
8 Elise McK. Morgan, 42 T.C. 1080 (1964) ; aff'd per curiam Morgan v. Commissioner,
353 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1965).
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when all intervening interests in, and rights to the actual possession
or enjoyment of, the property have expired or are held by persons
other than the taxpayer [or certain relatives] .... 89
In the typical case, of course, delaying the deduction until the
gift is completed means that only the estate tax will be affected by
the transaction.
CONCLUSION
Recent newspaper and magazine issues have dedicated extensive
space to the "taxpayer revolt" and to exposure of the myriad "tax
shelters" and "loopholes" in the federal income tax law. The press
has delighted in exploring the ingenious devices employed by those
millionaires who pay no income taxes. Only rarely, however, do
the popular media touch upon the vast area of tax intricacies which
this paper attempts to introduce.
But if future interests have been ignored by the press, they have
not been ignored in practice. Perhaps the inability of future interest
devices to arouse public outrage is a major advantage which accrues
from their use.
Only the most sophisticated tax practitioners are equipped to
totally avail their clients of these plans. The public apathy may stem
from ignorance; or, it may be that the typical future interest trans-
actions are so imbued with benevolent motives that the public
willingly overlooks the donor's tax advantages. The fact that the
taxpayer's death is frequently a prerequisite to his final reward
of tax savings could be another reason for the relative lack of
public concern.
This paper has to a degree deemphasized the factual distinc-
tions upon which the cases are often decided. The facts seem sig-
nificant in these cases primarily with regard to determination of the
taxpayer's intent. The courts seem inclined to construe the statutes
and regulations more liberally in favor of the taxpayer who can
show by the facts that his plan was motivated by benevolent con-
siderations which raise it above the status of a mere tax "gimmick."
Hopefully, the reader has become aware of the future interest
devices being used in tax law practice. A reader who could conceive
new applications in the areas of either income tax or estate and gift
tax plans would be welcomed with enthusiasm by the fraternity of
tax free millionaires.
Of more importance, though, is the prospect that the tax laws
in this area may be providing a framework which promotes the fi-
89 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(f).
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nancial support of institutions recognized as beneficial by public
welfare standards.
James Gehres
